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"hat determines the role of the public
and private sectors in the nation's pay-
ments system? This Economic Commen-
tary examines the transfer and settlement
of large-dollar payments, an exercise made
timely by recent announcements of two
potential innovations. In the public sector,
the Federal Reserve has asked for comment
on a proposal to open its Fedwire payment
network two hours earlier each banking
day, at 6:30 am, and to keep even longer
hours in the future. In the private sector,
The Global Settlement Fund, Inc., has
formed a new network for making pay-
ments 24 hours a day.
The purpose of this article is not to
evaluate these specific innovations, but
to argue that price competition between
Fedwire and private networks, man-
dated by the Monetary Control Act of
1980, is only one factor determining
the public/private mix. The Federal
Reserve's monetary policy responsibil-
ities also have an important influence
on the viability of public and private
large-dollar payment service.
For about 60 years, Federal Reserve
Banks provided payment services with-
out charge to any bank that was a mem-
ber of the Federal Reserve System.
Membership carried with it the costly
obligation to maintain required reserves
of non-interest-bearing base money.
With passage of the Monetary Control
Act in 1980, Congress changed this ar-
rangement. Thereafter, all depository
institutions (referred to here simply as
banks) faced reserve requirements and
could use Federal Reserve payment
services, but these services had to be
priced at levels intended to recover
their full cost, including an allowance
for the interest expense and profit mar-
gin that competing private suppliers
would require.
Explicit price competition between pri-
vate and federal payment services was a
true innovation in American payments
history. Prior to 1980, successive Con-
gresses and federal agencies had man-
dated specific federal payment services,
beginning with the charter of the First
Bank of the United States in 1791 and the
Mint Act of 1792. Since 1980, the mix of
public and private service has reflected a
market response to prices based on the
relative efficiency of federal and private
providers. Price, however, should not be
viewed as the only determinant of federal
involvement in the payments system.
Monetary policy objectives and operating
mechanisms influence both design and
demand in large-dollar payment service.
• Monetary Policy
and Systemic Risk
In a market economy grounded in pri-
vate property, the presumption is that
unregulated private-market production
is preferred to public-sector production
in the absence of some "externality"
that prevents optimal market outcomes.
In the case of immediate large-dollar
payments, systemic risk is a potential
externality. The sheer size of payments
(some banks routinely make daily pay-
ments hundreds of times larger than
their normal operating balance at the
Fed), and the interrelatedness of the
banks and financial markets involved
in them, create the possibility of sys-
temic risk. That is, if one bank can't
The Monetary Control Act of 1980
mandates price competition between
public- and private-sector payment
services. Competition ensures effi-
cient, low-price service in making
large-dollar payments on the Federal
Reserve Banks' Fedwire network.
Nevertheless, Fedwire's market share
could decline. Monetary policy limits
the volume of deposits used in making
Fedwire payments, while competing
private networks provide payment
services that use Treasury securities
to economize on those deposits.
ISSN 0428-1276complete its payments on a day, it
might leave otherwise solvent receiving
banks illiquid and unable to pay yet
other banks, who in turn become unable
to pay, resulting in a cascade of failed
payments, rejected transactions, market
turmoil, and general financial crisis.
The crucial monetary policy aspect of
the systemic risk concept is not that
losses may occur from failed payments,
or even that losses might be large.
These are, after all, risk exposures
against which all private agents must
expect to protect themselves through in-
surance, adequate capital, and prudent
screening of counterparties. A public
policy concern arises because even pru-
dent banks and financial institutions
may be unable to identify and control
their exposure to systemic risk, which
can be transmitted through perfectly
creditworthy institutions caught up in a
systemic cascade of illiquidity.
A bank run is the classic image of a li-
quidity crisis, in which the actual failure
of one or more banks sends worried de-
positors running to withdraw cash even
from sound banks. Federal deposit in-
surance minimizes the likelihood of
such panics among small depositors,
which could disrupt payments. Of
course, insurance can create a moral
hazard for the insurance system.' If
insured depositors can ignore the credit
quality of their banks, then the insurance
system may need to devise a substitute
for market discipline, using supervision
and examination, for example, to prevent
poorly run banks from draining the in-
surance fund.
Large-dollar payment systems can allow
an electronic "run" on a single bank, as
worried lenders or depositors shift funds
from it to other banks either directly or
by purchasing securities. However, un-
like the classic case, the banking system
does not lose reserves when funds move
from bank to bank, and solvent banks
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normally can cover temporary shortages
of reserves by borrowing in the inter-
bank markets. A genuine liquidity
crisis would emerge if some banks
were to hoard reserves—reflecting ner-
vousness about the safety of lending in
an unsettled period, or arrival of unex-
pected payments after the conclusion
of normal business, or a computer fail-
ure that masks a bank's true position or
makes transfers impossible. Such illi-
quidity might also reflect shrinkage of
the aggregate supply of reserves, per-
haps from an unexpected drain into the
Treasury's account at the Fed. Within
the whirlwind of daily large-dollar pay-
ments, an unexpected shortfall of re-
ceipts may prevent a bank from mak-
ing expected payments, leaving other
banks with unexpected shortfalls and
producing an incipient systemic crisis.
Federal Reserve monetary policy is in-
tended to protect against systemic li-
quidity crises by providing a supply of
base money that is noninflationary, yet
adequate to meet the needs of those
making payments. The Fed has two
familiar methods of supplying addition-
al base money when more liquidity is
needed. Its open-market purchases of
Treasury securities, paid for by creating
deposit balances at the Reserve Banks,
can inject additional base money into
the banking system if large-dollar pay-
ment flows are disrupted. With supply
augmented, creditworthy banks in need
of funds to settle their obligations might
be able to borrow same-day funds in
the interbank markets. By operational
choice, the Fed conducts open-market
operations only once a day, in the late
morning. Thus, the Reserve Banks' dis-
count window is an important second
emergency source of base money for
the banking system later in the day, pro-
viding adjustment credit directly to
creditworthy banks in need of funds.
These Federal Reserve assurances of
adequate liquidity, however, create a
moral hazard analogous to that of de-
posit insurance. If sound banks need not
protect themselves from payment fail-
ures, regardless of how uncertain their
occurrence and impact may be, then
the Federal Reserve may need a mecha-
nism to ensure that the banking system
maintains some minimum aggregate
level of base money for market alloca-
tion to banks facing unexpected pay-
ment disruptions. Otherwise, the supply
of base money might tend to become
demand driven through the aggregateliquidity escape valves, with potential
inflationary or deflationary conse-
quences. One function of reserve re-
quirements is to protect against moral
hazard: Open-market operations supply a
pool of funds needed by the banking sys-
tem to meet reserve requirements; averag-
ing of reserves over a maintenance period
allows interbank markets to reallocate
this pool of funds daily to banks in need;
and market discipline exerts pressure on
banks to avoid illiquidity.'
The usefulness of reserve balances as a
cushion against unexpected interruptions
has been dwindling, however, with
periodic reductions in requirements, in-
creased reliance on vault cash to meet
those requirements, and soaring volumes
of same-day payments (see figure 1).
Increasingly, the pool of deposit balances
available to limit the Federal Reserve's
moral hazard has been reinforced through
the design and regulation of large-dollar
payment systems.
• Moral Hazard and
Large-Dollar Payments
Fedwire is the Federal Reserve Banks'
own telecommunication network. Banks
use Fedwire in making almost half a tril-
lion dollars of immediate payments daily,
mostly of large amounts, by direct trans-
fer of deposit balances at the Federal
Reserve Banks. Using Fedwire eliminates
systemic risk once a payment message is
received, because Fedwire payments are
settled immediately — in effect, the re-
ceiving bank gets an irrevocable obliga-
tion of the Fed, even if the paying bank
has insufficient funds.
Eliminating systemic risk on Fedwire can
contribute to the Fed's moral hazard.
Within broad limits, paying banks are al-
lowed to initiate transfers when their ac-
counts are temporarily overdrawn during
the day, avoiding the moral hazard protec-
tion of reserve deposits. The Fed thereby
accepts some risk that an overdrawn pay-
ing bank might be able to remove its
overdraft only by borrowing at the dis-
count window. Current limits on daylight
overdrafts, plus planned introduction of a
fee for daylight overdrafts in excess of a
minimum amount, limit the moral hazard
created by eliminating systemic risk
from Fedwire payments.
The Clearing House Interbank Payment
System (CHIPS), operated by the private
New York Clearing House, handles a
slightly larger daily dollar value of pay-
ments than Fedwire. This is a net settle-
ment system. A participating bank sends
and receives nonwithdrawable payment
messages on the CHIPS network through-
out a day, building up a net debit or credit
position with respect to all the other
banks. Payments are settled only at 6:00
p.m. each day, when a bank actually pays
or receives the cumulative net amount of
its in- and out-payments from and to all
other participating banks through its ac-
count at a Federal Reserve Bank.
A net settlement system could embody
substantial systemic risk if one bank's in-
ability to cover its net debit at settlement
were to prevent all other participating
banks from settling. Provision for an "un-
winding" was once thought to be a way
of dealing with such a settlement failure,
removing all of the day's payments and
receipts of the troubled bank and calculat-
ing new settlement positions without any
need for additional central-bank funds.
The danger with unwinding is that, for
some of the remaining banks, it might
create unexpected new debit positions too
large to cover quickly. Moreover, mem-
bers of a net settlement network might
discount this danger, reasoning that the
Fed has a monetary policy responsibility
to supply whatever funds might be
needed to ensure settlement. This moral
hazard is now limited on CHIPS by
protections negotiated with the Fed.
These protections include membership
standards, real-time monitoring and en-
forcement of limits on debit positions,
and a requirement that, in the event of a
default, each participant will pay an addi-
tional amount to complete the settlement.
This additional obligation is in turn
backed with preposted collateral in the
form of U.S. government securities. The
securities limit moral hazard both direct-
ly, by ensuring settlement, and indirectly,
by creating a cost incentive for partici-
pants to monitor and control the solvency
and liquidity of fellow network users, lest
the securities be used.
Treasury securities, at least conceptually,
might be transferred directly, rather than
placed in a guarantee fund, as a substitute
for transferring ownership of scarce de-
posit balances at the Fed. Treasury secur-
ities carry no more credit risk than de-
posits at the Fed, and securities bear
interest, making them less costly to hold
than deposits.
Practically, however, making final pay-
ments with Treasury securities is not an
alternative to Fedwire and CHIPS. De-
posits at the Fed and in banks are meas-
ured in dollar units, divisible into pennies,
but a unit of a Treasury security is defined
as an indivisible face value of $10,000
(bills) or $ 1,000 (notes and bonds) to be
repaid at maturity. Different coupon rates
and maturity dates make the current-
dollar market value of a unit of each
specific issue different from that of each
other issue, with market values changing
around the clock as activity in the second-
ary market moves around the globe. Thus,
while Treasury interest-bearing securities
are just as free of credit risk as deposits at
the Fed, interest-rate risk makes their fu-
ture dollar value uncertain. This is a
serious disadvantage as long as prices of
almost everything are denominated in
dollars, not in units of one or more
Treasury securities.GlobeSet, operated by The Global Settle-
ment Fund, Inc., is a new payment net-
work using Treasury securities indirectly
in place of deposit money, but designed
o
to avoid the problems just outlined. Par-
ticipants make immediate final payments
to one another over the GlobeSet network
by direct transfers of shares in the Fund,
which is essentially a mutual fund of
Treasury securities. Service is available
24 hours a day between Sunday evening
and Friday night, New York time. The
Fund proposes to set up comparable facil-
ities for transactions denominated in Jap-
anese yen and in British pounds that
would allow 24-hour settlement of for-
eign exchange trading of the three curren-
cies among GlobeSet participants.
Note the difference between GlobeSet
payments and the payment facilities
commonly offered to the public through
money market mutual funds (MMMFs).
Holders of MMMF shares write checks
denominated in dollars, not fund shares,
that are paid by redeeming fund shares
and transferring deposit balances at the
Fed to the recipient's bank in settle-
ment. GlobeSet payments involve no
bank or Fed deposits. Payments are
denominated and made directly in Fund
shares that the participants agree to
accept as final payment.
GlobeSet payments are divisible not
into dollars and pennies, but into individ-
ual shares whose dollar value when
bought or redeemed for deposit money
will be maintained as close as possible to
$ 1.00. Interest-rate risk is limited by re-
stricting the portfolio to short maturities
— no less than 50 percent in Treasury
bills, notes, and bonds with 90 days or
less to maturity, and the remainder in
overnight repurchase agreements of the
same limited set of securities, with a max-
imum maturity of the whole portfolio of
no more than 50 days. A dollar equiva-
lent of a share is determined every two
hours, by dividing the amortized-cost (not
market) value of the portfolio by the num-
ber of shares outstanding. Amortized cost
"involves valuing an instrument at its
cost and thereafter assuming a constant
amortization or accretion to maturity of
any interest, discount, or premium."
Payment of a dollar-denominated obli-
gation with the most recently calculated
dollar-equivalent number of shares is
only approximately the same as realiz-
ing the per-share market value of Fund
investments. In return for accepting a
possible discrepancy between amor-
tized cost and market valuation, partici-
pants can maintain balances that earn a
return and that can be used to make im-
mediate final payments 24 hours a day.
Systemic settlement risk is apparently
absent in GlobeSet payments because
each payment is final when made and
is made only with actual Fund shares.
• Off-Hours Transactions and
Alternative Payment Networks
A growing volume of off-hours dollar-
denominated transactions, including off-
shore transactions in European and Asian
time zones and nighttime trading in finan-
cial markets in the United States, is draw-
ing special attention to risk exposures in
large transactions. For example, the
open hours of the payment networks of
Japan, Germany, and the United States do
not overlap. In a purchase of yen for dol-
lars in Japan, the yen receipt would be
settled at 3:00 p.m. in Japan, 17 hours
before the dollar payment ultimately is
settled on CHIPS, at 6:00 p.m. in New
York. Also, final settlement of margin
calls in nighttime trading of futures con-
tracts at the Chicago Mercantile Ex-
change has had to be delayed, awaiting
the opening of Fedwire — an instance
cited in support of both the proposed ear-
lier opening of Fedwire and the initial use
of GlobeSet.
As these examples suggest, incentives
for innovation are operating in the mar-
ket for large-dollar payment service.
Private operators have an incentive to
develop payment services for those in
the off-hours market seeking to reduce
risk exposures from delayed payments.
Moreover, as long as new private serv-
ices embody acceptable finality assur-
ances, they would also reduce the Fed's
moral hazard now inherent in delayed
settlement of payments for off-hours
transactions.
The Federal Reserve could develop
payment services that reduce risk ex-
posures in the off-hours market. Open-
ing Fedwire earlier, or even 24 hours a
day, would allow more timely settle-
ment of payments. As long as this did
not create unacceptably large tempo-
rary overdrafts, using Fedwire would
also reduce moral hazard.
• Concluding Comment
To what extent might successful in-
novations be expected to come from
the public sector, and to what extent
from the private sector? The Monetary
Control Act suggests that price com-
petition will provide the answer, but
price isn't everything in the market for
large-dollar payments, where networks
must embody protections against moral
hazard for the Fed. Treasury securities
are an important protection in private
networks, and the quantity of these
interest-bearing securities in the hands
of the public has increased substantially
over the past two decades (see figure 1).
Balances at the Fed, along with increas-
ingly tough limitations on daylight
overdrafts, are the moral hazard protec-
tion on Fedwire.'' However, the com-
bination of dwindling reserve require-
ments, increasing use of vault cash in
place of balances at the Fed to satisfy re-
quirements, practical constraints on the
size of required clearing balances, and
the cost of holding non-interest-bearing
excess reserve balances places tight
limits on the supply of balances consis-
tent with a noninflationary monetary
policy. Regardless of price, the Fed's
monetary policy responsibilities and its
current operational linkages with the
banking system — notably statutory
prohibition of interest on both required
and excess reserves — could limit the fu-
ture share of Fedwire in the market for
large-dollar payment services.• Footnotes
1. Wayne D. Angell sketched some of these
influences in "Large-Value Payment Sys-
tems: What Have We Learned?" presented
at the 12th Payment Systems International
Conference, London, October 7, 1992.
2. Systemic risk is only one of many cate-
gories of risk associated with payment and
delivery in transactions. For a more com-
plete description of potential risks, see
C.E.V. Borio and P. Van den Bergh, "The
Nature and Management of Payment Sys-
tem Risks: An International Perspective,"
Bank for International Settlements, Eco-
nomic Paper No. 36, February 1993.
3. Moral hazard refers to an incentive prob-
lem in insurance. The insurer may eliminate
an insured's incentive to avoid a risk precisely
because any losses arising from that risk will
be reimbursed from insurance. Coinsurance is
a common remedy, using loss-sharing to main-
tain the insured's incentive to prevent losses.
Another approach is to use inspection and re-
quirements to remove risks, substituting the
insurer's risk control for that of the insured.
4. Providing base money "on tap" need not
be hazardous as long as the Fed's price is right
for noninflationary growth of the economy.
However, the monetary policy tradition in the
United States is for direct lending at a below-
market discount rate. More important than the
level of the rate, direct lending places a severe
burden on the central bank, in a nation with a
multitude of depository institutions, of avoiding
adverse selection in lending. See E. J. Stevens,
"Comparing Central Banks' Rulebooks," Fed-
eral Reserve Bank of Cleveland, Economic Re-
view, vol. 28, no. 3 (1992 Quarter 3), pp. 2-15.
5. Banks must hold reserves equal to a re-
quired percentage of certain deposit liabilities.
After deducting vault cash held during a prior
period, a bank may be required to maintain a
deposit balance at the Fed, but only on aver-
age over a maintenance period. Banks that
hold balances on any day can defer progress
in meeting their requirement until another day
in order to lend to banks in urgent need of
funds. Daily movements in interbank interest
rates can provide the incentives for this reallo-
cation of the aggregate pool of reserve funds
within a reserve averaging period.
6. Two technical adjustments have offset the
dwindling usefulness of reserve requirements.
In addition to required reserves, banks can
contract to hold required clearing balances
that earn credits at the level of the federal
funds rate. The role of this supplement is lim-
ited because earnings credits can be used only
to pay for Federal Reserve Bank priced serv-
ices and because the volume of such balances
appears to be sensitive to the level of interest
rates. Also, provision for carryover of an ex-
cess or deficient reserve position into an adja-
cent maintenance period was increased from 2
percent to 4 percent of required reserves in
October 1992.
7. While not an actual unwinding, the
failure of Bankhaus Herstatt in 1974 high-
lights these difficulties. German authorities
closed this bank during the U.S. banking
day, after Herstatt had received final pay-
ment of marks for foreign exchange transac-
tions, but before its counterparties had
received dollars through CHIPS. The time-
consuming difficulties encountered in com-
pleting settlement led many to conclude that
unwinding would not be feasible for a same-
day net settlement system.
8. "GlobeSet" is the registered mark of The
Global Settlement Fund, Inc., 61 Broadway,
New York, N.Y., 10006. Complete details of
the intended operation of the Fund are avail-
able in the firm's Prospectus.
9. Deposits are involved only in shifting
balances between dollars and shares, and
even this can be accomplished without
deposits by using Treasury securities.
10. "If at any time, however, the market
value of... total assets deviates more than
1/2 of 1 percent from their value determined
on an amortized cost basis, the Board of
Directors will consider whether any action
should be initiated to prevent any adverse ef-
fects on the Portfolio's shareholders.... There
may be periods during which the stated value
of an instrument determined under the amor-
tized cost method of valuation is higher or
lower than the price the Portfolio would re-
ceive if the instrument were sold, and the ac-
curacy of amortized cost valuation can be af-
fected by changes in interest rates and the
credit standing of issuers of the Fund's port-
folio investments .... There is no assurance
[of] a stable net asset value per share." From
The Global Settlement Fund, Inc., Prospec-
tus, as amended on September 4, 1992.
11. These risks — and recommendations to
central banks about their management — are
discussed in Bank for International Settle-
ments, Report on Netting Schemes, February
1989; and Report of the Committee on Inter-
bank Netting Schemes of the Central Banks of
the Group of Ten Countries, November 1990.
12. Detailed descriptions of a variety of
cases where innovations might prove useful
can be found in Board of Governors of the
Federal Reserve System, "Request for Com-
ment," Docket No. R-0778, Federal Regis-
ter, vol. 57, no. 199 (October 14, 1992).
13. Securities are required as collateral for
the daylight overdrafts of a small number of
specialized Fedwire users.
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